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THE INTENTIONAL ACT EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIVITY OF
WORKERS' COMPENSATION
In 1976 the Louisiana legislature amended the workers' compensa-
tion statutes to provide an intentional act exception to the exclusivity of
workers' compensation in Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032.1 The statute
now expressly provides that a workers' compensation remedy shall not
"affect the liability of the employer, or any officer, director, stockholder,
partner or employee of such employer or principal . . . resulting from
an intentional act."' By failing to define "intentional act," the legislature
left it to the courts to determine what type of conduct would constitute
an intentional act on the part of the employer or coemployee such as
would permit the plaintiff to recover tort damages as well as his workers'
compensation benefits. After eight years, the courts are still struggling
to decide this issue.
History of the Intentional Act Exception
Historically, the workers' compensation remedy has been the exclusive
remedy against the employer and his insurance carrier if the employee's
injury fell within the coverage formula of the act. The employee was en-
titled to fixed benefits for an injury based on the sole criterion of whether
the accident arose out of the course and scope of his employment,
regardless of the employer's lack of fault. The employer was precluded
from asserting the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption
Copyright 1984, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.
1. (Supp. 1984). LA. R.S. 23:1032 provides:
The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee or his dependent on
account of injury, or compensable sickness or disease for which he is entitled
to compensation under this Chapter, shall be exclusive of all other rights and
remedies of such employee, or any principal or any officer, director, stockholder,
partner or employee of such employer or principal, for said injury, or compen-
sable sickness or disease. For purposes of this Section, the word "principal" shall
be defined as any person who undertakes to execute any work which is a part
of his trade, business or occupation in which he was engaged at the time of the
injury, or which he had contracted to perform and contracts with any person
for the execution thereof.
Nothing in this Chapter shall affect the liability of the employer, or any of-
ficer, director, stockholder, partner or employee of such employer or principal
to a fine or penalty under any other statute or'the liability, civil or criminal,
resulting from an intentional act.
The immunity from civil liability provided by this Section shall not extend to:
1) any officer, director, stockholder, partner or employee of such employer or
principal who is not engaged at the time of the injury in the normal course and
scope of his employment; and 2) to the liability of any partner in a partnership
which has been formed for the purpose of evading any of the provisions of this
section.
Emphasis added.
2. Id. (emphasis added).
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of risk to defeat the employee's claim for benefits.' In exchange for this
no-fault liability, the employer was relieved of the prospect of large damage
judgments.4 Thus, workers' compensation has traditionally been a quid
pro quo remedy.
Courts in the United States have recognized a common law right of
action for an intentional injury inflicted by an employer on his employee,
notwithstanding the exclusivity of a workers' compensation statute.' One
argument which has been propounded in support of this action is that
the injury does not fall within the coverage of the act because most com-
pensation statutes require that the employee receive injury by accident.
If the employer intentionally injures the employee, he can not logically
claim it was an accident.6 This right of action in tort is also recognized
for policy reasons. If an employer knows that he will be liable in tort
for intentional acts committed by hiiself or a coemployee, he will
presumably take extra safety precautions in order to avoid potentially large
damage judgments. Therefore, this right of action will tend to encourage
safety in the work place.
While many states agree that an employee who is injured by some
type of conduct other than negligence is entitled to something in addition
to workers' compensation benefits, the states disagree as to what types
of conduct will fall within this category. Undoubtedly, the traditional in-
tentional torts of assault and battery are included. For example, when
an employer strikes an employee, the courts have little difficulty concluding
that this conduct was intentional.7 The difficulty arises when the employer's
conduct is so excessively negligent that the conduct must be deemed to
be intentional. The disagreement may be illustrated by comparing two
states' treatment of the exception.
Arizona has codified the exception in its workers' compensation
statutes.8 An exception exists for injuries caused by the employer's or
coemployee's "wilful misconduct." The statute defines "wilful miscon-
duct" as an act done knowingly and purposely with the direct object of
injuring another. The statute has been interpreted as requiring a "deliberate
intention as distinguished from some kind of intention presumed from
gross negligence." 9 An argument that constructive intent would satisfy
the requirement for wilful misconduct has been rejected.'" The Arizona
3. 1 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 2 (1983).
4. 2A id. § 65.
5. See, e.g., Boek v. Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 231 N.W. 233 (1930); Castleberry
v. Goolsby Bldg. Corp., 617 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. 1981).
6. 2A A. LARSON, supra note 3, § 69.
7. See, e.g., Meyer v. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, 88 Cal. App. 3d 176, 151 Cal. Rptr.
597 (1979); Jones v. Thomas, 426 So. 2d 609 (La. 1983).
8. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1022 (1983).
9. Serna v. Statewide Contractors, 6 Ariz. App. 12, 15, 429 P.2d 504, 508 (1967).
10. Id.
1508 [Vol. 44
courts seem to allow recovery in tort only where the injured employee
can demonstrate an actual desire on the part of the injuring party to cause
the harm.
In contrast to Arizona's treatment, California has adopted liberal stan-
dards for allowing the injured employee additional recovery. If the
employee's injury or death is proximately caused by a "willful physical
assault" by the employer, the employee may bring an action at law for
damages against the employer." If the employee's injury is not caused
by such an assault, but by reason of the serious and willful misconduct
of the employer or his managing representative, the amount of compen-
sation recoverable is increased by one-half."2 The California courts have
interpreted serious and willful misconduct as "an act deliberately done
for the express purpose of injuring another, or intentionally performed
either with knowledge that serious injury is a probable result or with a
positive, active, wanton, reckless and absolute disregard of its possibly
damaging consequences."' 3 The courts have allowed additional recovery
when the employer knows of a dangerous condition which is likely to
cause injury, but fails to take precautions to eliminate the danger."' This
standard is extremely liberal when compared to the actual desire standard
applied in Arizona.
Louisiana appears to have adopted a standard which falls somewhere
in between the Arizona and California standards. In 1981, the Louisiana
Supreme Court had an opportunity to express its interpretation of the
intentional act exception of the Louisiana Workers' Compensation Law
in Bazley v. Tortorich.'5 Prior to 1981, some Louisiana appellate courts
had interpreted intentional act to mean the defendant entertained a desire
to bring about the result and should have believed that the result was
substantially certain to follow.'" Thus, the plaintiff was required to prove
the defendant's actual desire in every case. The supreme court in Bazley
concluded that intentional act means the same in the workers' compensa-
tion statute as intentional tort in reference to civil liability. The court
adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts' definition of intentional tort
which provides that the defendant either desired to cause the consequences
of his act or believed the consequences were substantially certain to result."
11. CAL. LAB. CODE § 3602 (West Supp. 1984).
12. Id. § 4553.
13. Mercer-Fraser Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 40 Cal. 2d 102, 120, 251 P.2d
955, 964 (1953) (emphasis added).
14. Rogers Materials Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 63 Cal. 2d 717, 408 P.2d
737, 48 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1965).
15. 397 So. 2d 475 (La. 1981).
16. E.g., Crenshaw v. Service Painting Co., 394 So. 2d 706 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981);
Guidry v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 359 So. 2d 637 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied,
362 So. 2d 578 (La. 1978).
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). Prior to Bazley, intentional torts
150919841 NO TES
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The court expressly rejected the conjunctive test which the lower courts
had adopted, thus eliminating the plaintiff's difficult task of proving ac-
tual desire on the part of the injuring party. The plaintiff need only prove
that the defendant was substantially certain of the resulting consequences.
The courts, however, are now faced with the problem of determining
whether or not a defendant was "substantially certain."
The problems which have arisen since Bazley can be broken down
into two main areas: (1) the court's requirements for alleging an inten-
tional act in the plaintiff's petition, and (2) the need for a manageable
standard in order to determine whether the defendant was substantially
certain.
Pleading the Intentional Act
A preliminary pitfall for many plaintiffs has been inadequate pleading
of an intentional act. Only a handful of reported cases have actually been
decided on their merits; in most of the reported cases, the courts have
sustained exceptions of no cause of action due to insufficient allegations
in the plaintiff's petition. Many courts have held that the plaintiff's allega-
tions that defendant's acts were "substantially certain" to cause harm
were mere conclusions of the pleader, while the law requires plaintiff to
allege specific facts to show how or why the defendant knew the plain-
tiff's injury was substantially certain to follow from his acts."8
The Louisiana Supreme Court recently liberalized the pleading re-
quirements in Mayer v. Valentine Sugars, Inc.'9 The court held that the
plaintiff had alleged a cause of action for an intentional act when he
alleged that the defendants acted with the knowledge and belief that in-
jury to the plaintiff was substantially certain to follow from their acts.
The trial court had sustained the employer's exception of no cause of
action because of the conclusory manner in which the element of intent
was alleged." Both the supreme court and the court of appeal relied on
article 856 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure which provides:
"Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person may
be alleged generally." Consequently, the supreme court concluded that
it was permissible for the employee to plead the intent element generally
and without particularity."
were very insignificant in Louisiana due to the general disallowance of punitive damages
in Louisiana. Attorneys have found it useless to attempt to prove an intentional tort when
their recovery would be the same upon proof of negligence. This accounts for the lack
of jurisprudence in Louisiana dealing with the proof of intentional torts.
18. See Shores v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 413 So. 2d 315, 318 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
19. 444 So. 2d 618 (La. 1984).
20. Id. at 619.
21. Id. at 620; see also Hurst v. Massey, 411 So. 2d 622 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 413 So. 2d 900 (La. 1982).
1510 [Vol. 44
NOTES
The effect of the supreme court's decision in Mayer may have unfor-
tunate consequences in the future because it does violence to the concept
of fact pleading in Louisiana. Article 891 of the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure provides in pertinent part: "The petition . . . .shall contain
a short, clear, and concise statement of the object of the demand and
of the material facts upon which the cause of action is based . .. .
The petition must include material facts which show how or why the defen-
dant believed injury to the plaintiff was substantially certain to result. 22
The plaintiff's allegation in Mayer that the defendant acted with the
knowledge that injury to the plaintiff was substantially certain to follow
is merely another way of alleging that the defendant's acts were inten-
tional. The plaintiff has not alleged the material facts from which one
can infer that the defendant had this knowledge.
Article 856 of the Code of Civil Procedure was never intended to
be an exception to article 891's requirement of pleading material facts.
Reading these articles in pari materia, a result which is contrary to Mayer
can be reached. In full, article 856 provides: "In pleading fraud or mistake,
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be alleged with par-
ticularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a
person may be alleged generally." The purpose of article 856 arguably
was twofold: (1) to make the general rules of pleadings when fraud or
mistake is alleged stricter in order to discourage frivolous claims of fraud
or mistake by requiring a detailed evidentiary factual basis to support
such an allegation, and (2) to distinguish fraud or mistake from intent,
malice, knowledge, and other conditions of mind and therefore not re-
quire these latter elements to be alleged with great particularity. These
states of mind, however, must still be pleaded under the general rule re-
quiring allegations of material facts.23 The comments to article 856 sup-
port this argument by noting that under Louisiana's system of fact
pleading, all material allegations of the cause of action or defense must
be pleaded. Hence, the first sentence of this article was actually not need-
ed, but it was included to emphasize the necessity of pleading full par-
ticulars of the fraud or mistake averred. The comments go on to say that
the other states of mind referred to in the second sentence cannot be ful-
ly particularized, and can only be raised through a general allegation. This
last comment apparently means that these states of mind may be alleged
22. Cf. Delta Bank & Trust Co. v. Lassiter, 383 So. 2d 330 (La. 1980).
23. An example of an allegation of a material fact to support the conclusion that defen-
dant acted with the knowledge that injury to the plaintiff was substantially certain to follow
would be that defendant ordered plaintiff to work on a tower without ropes or safety devices
when defendant knew it was a very windy day. This is distinguished from the more par-
ticular evidentiary fact that the defendant had told another employee that the wind was
blowing about 30 miles per hour just prior to the accident. It is not necessary that plaintiff
allege the more particular evidentiary facts.
19841
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generally in the sense that they may be alleged, as the general rule re-
quires, with material facts.
Additionally, the supreme court's decision in Mayer is not in accord
with the purposes of workers' compensation. As previously mentioned,
workers' compensation is a quid pro quo remedy. The employer has paid
premiums for workers' compensation insurance with the understanding
that all acts short of intentional ones would be covered by this insurance.
By allowing an employee to get past the exception of no cause of action
by making such a general conclusory statement, the employer's resources
will be substantially depleted in having to defend these suits. If the injury
is truly not an intentional one, the employer will have paid not only
workers' compensation insurance premiums for the injury but also the
high costs of defending a suit. This is clearly contrary to the purpose
of having a workers' compensation system. The courts have a duty to
promote judicial efficiency and should not permit a plaintiff to proceed
to trial when the allegations of his petition are clearly insufficient to en-
title him to recovery outside of the workers' compensation system.
Perhaps the strongest reason for requiring such a technical compliance
with the pleading requirements when an intentional act is alleged is that
the cause of action is an exception to the general rule that workers' com-
pensation is the exclusive remedy of the employee. Where an exception
is provided for in a statute laying down a general rule, the exception must
be strictly construed.2 4 The function of an exception is to exempt something
from the scope of the general words of a statute which would otherwise
be within the scope and meaning of such general words. Consequently,
the existence of an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute
should apply in all cases save those which are specifically excepted. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the general rule.2"
Even though the plaintiff complies with Mayer and the trial court
dismisses the defendant's exception of no cause of action, the battle is
not over. The Mayer court may have felt compelled to assist an injured
worker who may not have access to the crucial facts until he has a chance
to engage in formal discovery. But once the plaintiff has had a chance
to gather more detailed information to support his allegation of intent,
the court would no longer have reason to provide additional protection.
Indeed, the court in Mayer suggested that its reasoning would be dif-
ferent had a motion for summary judgment been at issue. 6 Article 966
of the Code of Civil Procedure allows a party to pierce the allegations
of facts in the pleadings and obtain relief by summary judgment where
the facts set forth in detail in affidavits, depositions, answers to inter-
rogatories, and admissions on file show that there are no genuine issues
24. State v. Dep't of City Civil Service, 215 La. 1007, 42 So. 2d 65 (1949).
25. E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 609 (1940).
26. 444 So. 2d at 620.
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of material fact to be tried. By strictly construing the intentional act ex-
ception at this stage of the proceedings, the courts could give recognition
to the quid pro quo idea of workers' compensation and encourage judicial
efficiency while still protecting the injured employee's cause of action from
dismissal before he has had an opportunity to engage in discovery.
The Mayer decision on its face is a welcome relief to plaintiffs' at-
torneys. It has propounded the magic words which will set forth a cause
of action: "The defendant acted with the knowledge and belief that in-
jury to plaintiff was substantially certain to follow from his acts."
Although it will be tempting to grab on to these words, a plaintiff's at-
torney would be well advised to approach Mayer with caution. The deci-
sion was not unanimous, and the supreme court may find it necessary
to reconsider the standard it has set forth should it become apparent that
it has misinterpreted article 856 and has opened the courts to many
frivolous claims of intentional acts. Until this standard has become more
firmly embedded in Louisiana law, a plaintiff should allege all material
facts which he has available, particularly those which support the allega-
tion that the defendant intended to cause the harm. The allegations should
include specific acts and omissions of the defendant from which the in-
ference can be drawn that the defendant was substantially certain that
an injury would occur.
Determination of the Substantially Certain Standard
Although the pleadings have occupied the majority of the courts' time
in this area of the law, a major problem arises from the lack of a workable
standard for determining whether an employer or coemployee was
"substantially certain" of causing injury to the plaintiff. In order to adopt
such a standard, the courts must decide whether an objective or subjec-
tive determination will be used and what degree of certainty on the part
of the defendant will be "substantial."
Objective/Subjective Determination
The courts must decide whether the issue of the defendant's knowledge
at the time of the alleged intentional act will be an objective or subjective
determination. There has been some discussion among the courts of ap-
peal concerning an objective "should have known" standard. An argu-
ment has been made that unless the terms "should have known that the
result would follow" are included in the definition of substantially cer-
tain, the Louisiana Supreme Court's rejection of the requirement of prov-
ing actual desire in Bazley will have been superfluous because the alter-
native "substantially certain" test will also require proof of an actual
desire.27
27. See, e.g., McDonald v. Boh Bros. Constr. Co., 397 So. 2d 846 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1981).
1984] 1513
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Arguably, a distinction can be drawn by adopting a test which falls
somewhere between the subjective "actual desire" standard and the ob-
jective "should have known" standard. A possible middle position is a
subjective determination of what the defendant must have known or must
have believed the result would be. This standard is compatible with the
Bazley requirement that the defendant believed the consequences were
substantially certain to result.
This "must have known" standard can be analogized to the standard
applied in determining whether a plaintiff has assumed a risk in a tort
proceeding. In Langlois v. Allied Chemical Corp., ' the Louisiana Supreme
Court stated that assumption of risk is to be determined by a subjective
inquiry as opposed to the objective determination of contributory
negligence. Following Langlois, the supreme court explained this subjec-
tive inquiry in Prestenbach v. Sentry Insurance Co.:9 "[For purposes
of a knowing assumption of risk, we impute knowledge to a plaintiff,
not because he was in a position to make certain observations, but only
when he actually makes those observations and, from them, should
reasonably have known that a risk was involved." The trier of fact infers
what the plaintiff subjectively knew by looking at the objective evidence.
In the same sense, the trier of fact can examine the circumstances sur-
rounding an employer to infer that he must have known that the employee
would be injured.
A theoretical argument might be made that this subjective "must have
known" test of the defendant's knowledge would encourage hiring super-
visors who do not know how to do a job safely, since an ignorant super-
visor would be less likely to appreciate the consequences of his act than
one who is more safety conscious. This argument should be disregarded
because, as a practical matter, an employer hires on the basis of whether
an employee will help his business prosper, not on the basis of whether
an employee will save him from lawsuits. A supervisor who does not know
how to do a job safely will probably also not know how to do it effec-
tively. Additionally, an employer who allows dangerous conditions to
prevail in the workplace is subject to sanctions under provisions such as
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.30
The supreme court in Bazley lent some support to this "must have
known" standard. In its attempt to define intentional act, the court utilized
the Louisiana Criminal Code's definition of intent, noting that the civil
definition of intent in the Restatement (Second) of Torts is similar to
Louisiana's criminal definition." There are two types of intent in the
28. 249 So. 2d 133 (La. 1971), over'd on other grounds, Dorry v. LaFleur, 399 So.
2d 559 (La. 1981).
29. 340 So. 2d 1331, 1335 (La. 1976).
30. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982)).
31. 397 So. 2d at 481.
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criminal context-specific and general. Specific criminal intent is defined
as "that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that
the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow
his act or failure to act." 32 This language can be analogized to an in-
stance in which the employer or coemployee actually desires to cause in-
jury to the plaintiff, thus satisfying the first Bazley/Restatement defini-
tion of intent. General criminal intent is "present whenever . . . the cir-
cumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human
experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences
as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act." 3 3 The com-
ments which follow this definition state that a criminal defendant may
have general criminal intent when the jury "believes he 'must have' turned
his mind to the consequences in acting as he did." 3 ' Similarly, a jury
may find an employer responsible because he must have realized that in-
jury to his employee was substantially certain to follow his act or omis-
sion, thus satisfying the alternative Bazley/Restatement definition of
intent. 33
The must have known standard would be preferable because it would
fit within the contemplation of the supreme court's opinion in Bazley.
The supreme court's efforts to reduce the plaintiff's burden of proof by
adopting the disjunctive test will not have been a vain effort if this stan-
dard is adopted. This standard will give life to the alternative definition
of intent (substantially certain of the consequences) without resorting to
the level of mere negligence.
Certainty Which Is "Substantial"
Another problem faced by the courts is the lack of a clear standard
indicating what degree of certainty on the part of the defendant will be
deemed "substantial." Several of the lower courts have attempted to deter-
mine what degree of certainty is required by Bazley. In Jacobsen v.
Southeast Distributors," the injuring supervisor testified that he knew there
was a "reasonable probability" of an accident occurring in view of the
hazardous type of workc that the plaintiff was performing. The court found
that a reasonable probability was not a substantial certainty and, therefore,
reversed the trial court's finding of an intentional act. The court in Reagan
v. Olinkraft, Inc." held that a "reasonable anticipation" was insufficient
and attempted to redefine substantially certain as being "virtually sure"
or "nearly inevitable."
32. CREMNAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:10 (1968).
33. Id. (emphasis added).
34. Id. comment (emphasis added).
35. See also Mize v. Beker Indus. Corp., 436 So. 2d 1333 (La. App. 5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 440 So. 2d 761 (La. 1983).
36. 413 So. 2d 995 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982).
37. 408 So. 2d 937 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
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The supreme court, despite opportunities to grant writs and provide
more guidance to the Bazley requirement of substantial certainty, has
declined to do so. Perhaps this is an indication that the supreme court
wishes to leave a certain degree of flexibility with the lower courts. The
late Professor Leon Green noted that the term "substantial," when used
as a legal standard, is intended to be metaphysical. The trier of fact must
translate the metaphysical standard into his own standard and then measure
the conduct of the defendant by such standard.38 Professor Green stated:
The terms "substantial" and "appreciable" are not new terms
in the law, but they have not been rendered useless by overwork.
While they are relative terms, they are recognized as such. They
do not purport to be definite . . . . Hence they are not so
misleading. They are like the term "reasonable" in the test of
negligence. They are of a fast color, although only relative.39
Perhaps the supreme court's failure to draw a bright line rule was an
attempt to allow the lower court judges to weigh the various social policies
involved in the case at hand, and then to determine whether a remedy
outside of workers' compensation is justified."'
Proving Substantial Certainty
Once the plaintiff overcomes the burden of sufficiently alleging a cause
of action based on an intentional act, he must introduce evidence of the
circumstances which indicate that the injuring party must have known
that injury to the plaintiff was substantially certain to follow his acts or
omissions. To meet this burden, the plaintiff must introduce evidence which
tends to prove the defendant's awareness of the danger and the degree
of that danger. One factor would be the defendant's intelligence, as
evidenced by his level of education and participation in job safety train-
ing programs. Another important factor is the defendant's work experience
in the industrial setting in which the injury occurred. Additional factors
may be equally important, such as the defendant's knowledge of other
injuries which have recently occurred in a similar manner, whether the
defendant had been informed of the severe danger involved in perform-
ing a certain task, warnings received by the defendant from other
employees or safety inspectors concerning the gravity of a dangerous con-
dition, or the defendant's knowledge of the lack of the plaintiff's work
38. L. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE 138 (1927).
39. Id. at 140.
40. Although the trier of fact could be a judge or a jury, the reference here is to
the judge. This is so because the judge will be the one responsible for determining whether
or not the issue of the defendant's intent should be submitted to the jury. Based on the
social policies, the judge could determine as a matter of law that reasonable minds would




experience. The plaintiff must keep in mind that the time sequences in-
volved are essential in the determination of the defendant's substantial
certainty. If the factors which tend to prove the defendant's substantial
certainty are so far removed in time from the time of the injury, the
trier of fact may have difficulty finding any certainty on the part of the
defendant, much less substantial certainty.
Conclusion
The intentional act exception to workers' compensation is evidently
here to stay. The workers' compensation statutes have been amended
several times since 1976, but Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032 has re-
mained unchanged. In spite of the obvious confusion over the statute's
interpretation, the legislature has chosen to leave it to the courts to deter-
mine its fate. The confusion seems to have reached a peak, and the need
for a workable standard is evident. A reasonable and manageable stan-
dard which the courts could adopt is one in which an intentional act ex-
ception exists whenever the employer or coemployee actively desired the
consequences or must have known that injury to the plaintiff was substan-
tially certain to follow his act or omission. This standard, coupled with
the courts' better application of Louisiana's procedural rules governing
pleadings, should lead to a legitimate use of the intentional act exception.
Shannan Clare Sweeney
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